Replication Data for: Power Sharing and the Rule of Law in the Aftermath of Civil War

What effect do power-sharing institutions agreed to as part of civil war settlements have on the development of the rule of law in post–civil war states? We contend that power-sharing measures facilitate the emergence of the rule of law in two ways. First, they establish a form of institutional constraint that promotes judicial autonomy and independence. Second, they foster a sense of security among judges and other political actors that bolsters commitment to the law. We demonstrate the plausibility of a positive relationship between power sharing and the rule of law through an analysis of post–civil war states between the years 1948 and 2006. Our findings suggest that civil war settlements can help to establish the rule of law when they include mechanisms aimed at allaying the insecurities of political actors in the postconflict environment.

作为内战停火协定组成部分而确立的权力共享制度（power-sharing institutions），对战后国家的法治（rule of law）发展具有何种影响？我们主张，权力共享举措可通过两条路径助推法治的形成：其一，构建制度性约束机制，提升司法自主性与独立性；其二，在法官及其他政治行为体中培育安全感，强化其对法律的恪守。我们通过对1948年至2006年间内战战后国家的分析，论证了权力共享与法治之间正向关联的合理性。研究发现，若内战停火协定包含旨在缓解战后治理环境中政治行为体不安感的相关机制，则可助力法治的建立。