Replication Data for: The role of the Italian Constitutional Court in the policy agenda. Persistence and change between the First and Second Republic.

If we examine the current literature, no study on policy agenda has so far addressed the agenda of a Constitutional Court in a country that has recently experienced crucial changes in its political system. The present contribution on the Italian Constitutional Court seeks to bridge this gap. We aim at assessing the role the Italian Court plays in the policy process in both the First and the Second Republic by answering two research questions: 1) In its decisions does the Court accommodate themes that are neglected in the parliamentary legislative process? 2) Does the Court (and if so, how often) represent interests and values in opposition to the interests and values supporting the current legislative majorities? By employing an original dataset that puts together all decisions of constitutional illegitimacy under incidental review between the years 1983 and 2013, we found that in both Republics Court’s agenda is significantly more concentrated than Parliament’s agenda, and it does not broadly offer an alternative access point to the policy making for new or neglected issues. However, at the same time, the alternational system of the Second Republic seems to trigger more immediate and “salient” reactions from the Constitutional Court, which in that period becomes more prone to sanction recent legislation.

通过检视现有学术文献，目前尚无针对政治体制近期经历重大变革的国家之宪法法院（Constitutional Court）政策议程（policy agenda）的相关研究。本研究聚焦意大利宪法法院，旨在填补这一研究空白。我们旨在通过解答两项研究问题，评估意大利宪法法院在第一共和国与第二共和国的政策进程中所扮演的角色：1）法院的裁判是否纳入了议会立法程序中被忽视的议题？2）法院是否（若存在此类情形，其发生频次如何）代表与当前立法多数派所支持的利益及价值观相对立的利益与价值观？
本研究依托一套原创数据集（dataset），整合了1983年至2013年间所有附带性审查（incidental review）框架下的宪法违宪裁判案例。研究结果显示，在两个共和国时期，宪法法院的议程均显著比议会议程更为集中，且并未为新议题或被忽视的议题提供广泛的政策制定替代性参与渠道。但与此同时，第二共和国的轮流执政体制似乎会触发宪法法院更为即时且"显著"的回应——在此期间，法院更倾向于裁定近期立法违宪。