Replication Data for: Stick Then Carrot: When Do Governments Give Amnesty during Civil War?

Governments grant amnesties to rebel groups during civil wars and this is a puzzle. Why would the government offer an amnesty, which can be interpreted as a signal of weakness? In certain circumstances, offering amnesty is a rational policy choice. Governments should give amnesties when they are winning: the risk of misinterpreted signals is lessened, costs are low, rebel groups are weakened, and so amnesty can be used instrumentally to encourage defection or division among foot soldiers or as an incentive to leaders. Therefore, the government capitalizes on its military advantage and offers amnesty in a “stick then carrot” tactic. Using a database of amnesties during conflicts from 1990 to 2011, the article shows that governments are more likely to give amnesties following high rebel deaths. The use of amnesty during conflict is nuanced and context is important when understanding strategic choices.

内战期间，政府向反叛团体实施大赦，这一现象令人费解。为何政府会选择提供大赦——此举常被解读为自身实力孱弱的信号？在特定情境下，提供大赦实则是一项理性的政策选择。当政府占据军事优势时，便可推行大赦：此时信号被误读的风险降低、行动成本低廉，且反叛团体已遭削弱，因此大赦可作为工具性手段，用以煽动叛军士兵倒戈或引发内部分裂，亦或是对反叛首领施以利诱。由此可见，政府会利用自身军事优势，以“先棒后糖”的策略推行大赦。本文借助1990年至2011年间冲突期间大赦事件的数据库展开分析，结果表明：当反叛方伤亡惨重时，政府更有可能实施大赦。在冲突期间使用大赦的策略十分微妙，理解其战略选择时，具体情境至关重要。