Do Reticent Managers Misreport Data during Firm Surveys? Cross-Checking Reticent Managers’ Answers with Other Information

<i>Previous studies have shown reticent managers answer sensitive questions differently than other managers do. If this is because they misreport information, it will be difficult to accurately estimate averages or regression coefficients. It is possible, however, they answer sensitive questions differently because their firms are different. This paper presents evidence from a quasi-experiment that suggests reticent managers misreport sensitive information. The paper first shows reticent managers in Nigeria report paying higher wages than other managers do. It then shows workers at these firms report lower, or similar, wages. The simplest explanation for this is that reticent managers misreport wages</i>.

已有研究表明，缄默型管理者在回答敏感问题时的表现与其他管理者存在差异。若此种差异源于管理者对信息的不实报告，则将难以精准估算均值或回归系数。但此种回答差异也有可能源自其所供职的企业本身存在异质性。本文基于一项准实验的实证证据，表明缄默型管理者会对敏感信息进行不实报告。本文首先证实，尼日利亚的缄默型管理者上报的薪酬水平高于其他管理者。随后研究发现，这些企业的员工所申报的薪酬水平更低，或与其他企业员工的薪酬水平持平。对此最简洁的解释为，缄默型管理者存在薪酬不实报告的行为。