Replication Data for: Diversion for All? Domestic Political Problems and Relative Power

The rationalist version of diversionary uses of military force expects targets to strategically avoid states with diversionary incentives. When first advanced this argument helped account for the weak support for diversionary behavior. However, in recent years, a significant body of research has found support for diversionary theory. Given incentives to strategically avoid, this is puzzling. We address this puzzle by focusing on the strategic context in which diversion may take place. We argue that there is heterogeneity in the incentives actors have to engage in strategic conflict avoidance. Specifically, targets that are very strong or have their own domestic problems have less incentive to strategically avoid a potential diverter. Further, and contrary to extant research, we contend that relative power also influences the probability of being preyed upon when suffering domestic problems. In brief, by more fully examining the strategic context, we specify the conditions under which diversionary uses of force are likely to occur as well as when strategic conflict avoidance and preying about the vulnerable are likely