Do non-Enforcable Contracts Matter? Evidence from an International Experiment, 2008

Many verifiable contracts are impossible or difficult to enforce. This applies to contracts among family and friends, contracts regulating market transactions, and sovereign debt contracts. Do such non-enforceable contracts matter? "Do non-Enforcable Contracts Matter? Evidence from an International Experiment, 2008" studies repayment decisions in the presence of non-enforceable loan contracts by using a version of the trust game with participants from Norway and Tanzania. The main findings are that the specific content of the contract has no effect on loan repayment. Rather, the borrowers seem to be motivated by other moral motives, which contributes to explaining why they partly fulfill non-enforceable contracts. The results also show that some borrowers violate the axiom of first-order stochastic dominance when rejecting loan offers. This seems partly to be due to negative reciprocity, but may also reflect that there are individuals who have a preference for not accepting something referred to as a "loan". "Do non-Enforcable Contracts Matter? Evidence from an International Experiment, 2008" is generated in the project "Responsibility, Individual Choice and Restributive Policy".诸多可验证的合同均无法执行或难以执行，这一情形涵盖亲友间的协议、规范市场交易的合同，以及主权债务合同。此类不可强制执行的合同是否具有意义？《不可强制执行的合同是否具有意义？——来自2008年国际实验的证据》借助面向挪威与坦桑尼亚参与者的信任博弈（trust game）变体，探究了不可强制执行的借贷合同情境下的还款决策行为。核心研究结果显示，合同的具体条款对借贷还款行为并无显著影响。相反，借款人的还款动机似乎源自其他道德层面的动因，这一发现也为借款人为何会部分履行不可强制执行的合同提供了合理的解释。研究结果还显示，部分借款人在拒绝借贷邀约时，违反了一阶随机占优（first-order stochastic dominance）公理。此类行为部分源于负向互惠（negative reciprocity）动机，但也可能反映出部分个体存在拒绝接受被称为‘贷款’的事物的偏好。 《不可强制执行的合同是否具有意义？——来自2008年国际实验的证据》这项研究，隶属于“责任、个体选择与再分配政策”研究项目。