Richard Rorty and the transcendental paradox

Rorty shares the view of the linguistic phenomenon with Derrida as a dynamics of relations which lacks an interpretative “centre”. He also has a conception of experience in common with the French author whereby the classical concept of reference is dismissed: our use of “language” and our perception of what we call “brute facts” function as and coincide with equivalent systems of forces, games whose elements exist because they refer to some conventions. Nevertheless, a disagreement as fundamental as it is slight arises on the question of whether to consider this position itself as a sort of transcendentalism or not. Hence, the necessity to analyze how the Rortyan neo-pragmatism, in avoiding an acknowledgement of its own inevitable interpretative preference towards a certain type of language, develops into a contradiction and a paradox. The same paradox for which, paradoxically, Rorty had criticized Derrida’s quasi-transcendentalism