Replication Data for: Reforming Global Governance: Power, Alliance, and Institutional Performance

A large literature analyzes the determinants of change in international institutions, focusing on the role of systemic political and economic shocks. However, we consider this question also in more \"business-as-usual\" periods, asking when institutions of global governance reform and which states benefit from these changes. We argue that allies of IOs' leading stakeholders benefit more than non-aligned countries; however, we also document that reforms sometimes contain concessions to non-allied members. We theorize that while IO officials reward major stakeholders' allies in normal times, they provide concessions to non-allies during periods of poor IO performance to prevent these states from disengaging. Pairing statistical analysis using an original dataset of reforms at the World Bank between 1944-2018 with qualitative evidence, we find significant support for our hypotheses. Our findings help make sense of otherwise puzzling instances of power shifts within IOs.现有大量文献围绕国际制度变迁的决定因素展开研究，重点聚焦系统性政治与经济冲击的作用。不过，本文将这一研究议题拓展至更具“常规运营”特征的时期，探讨全球治理改革制度的落地时机，以及哪些国家能够从这类变革中获益。本文提出核心论点：国际组织（International Organizations，IO）主要利益相关方的同盟国，相较不结盟国家可从改革中获取更多收益；但同时本文也揭示，部分改革有时会向非同盟成员国做出让步。本文构建的理论框架表明：在常规运营阶段，国际组织官员会对主要利益相关方的同盟国予以优待；而在国际组织表现不佳的时期，官员则会向非同盟国做出让步，以阻止这些国家脱离该组织。本文结合针对1944年至2018年世界银行改革的原创数据集开展的统计分析与定性证据，对本文提出的假说进行验证，结果为本研究的假说提供了具有统计显著性的支持。本研究的发现有助于解释国际组织内部原本令人费解的权力转移现象。