Replication Data for: The Fiscal Roots of Financial Underdevelopment

Why do some countries indulge in financial repression, harming economic development in the process, whilst others promote financial development? Three main explanations have been put forth. Market failures, due to information asymmetries, mean that credit is rationed even when lenders could potentially benefit from making loans readily available. Political failures, due to state capture, mean that credit will be rationed as a way of generating rents for politically powerful financial incumbents. The state might, however, have its own fiscal reasons for politicizing the supply and price of credit, since financial repression provides easy-to-collect revenues. I draw on the third approach to argue that the state’s fiscal imperative is usually the primary reason behind financial repression, and even when private actors benefit they are subordinate to this concern. A dynamic panel analysis that exploits instrumental variables and a case study of Mexico adduce strong empirical support for my fiscal transaction cost theory.为何部分国家深陷金融抑制（financial repression）的泥沼，在此过程中损害了经济发展，而另有一些国家却积极推动金融发展？目前学界已提出三种主要解释路径：其一为市场失灵：受信息不对称影响，即便放贷机构本可通过放宽信贷供给获得收益，信贷依然会出现配给现象；其二为政治失灵：因国家俘获（state capture），信贷配给会成为向拥有政治影响力的金融在位群体攫取租金的手段；其三则源于财政动因：国家或许会出于自身财政考量，将信贷供给与信贷定价政治化，毕竟金融抑制能够带来易于征收的财政收入。本文依托第三种解释路径，提出国家的财政要务通常是金融抑制产生的核心动因，即便私人主体能够从中获益，这类收益也需服从于这一财政要务。本文通过采用工具变量的动态面板分析，以及针对墨西哥的案例研究，为本文提出的财政交易成本理论提供了强有力的实证支撑。