Replication Data for: Buying Brokers: Electoral Handouts beyond Clientelism in a Weak-Party State

Studies of electoral clientelism—the contingent exchange of material benefits for electoral support—frequently presume the presence of strong parties. Parties facilitate monitoring and enforcement of vote-buying and allow brokers to identify core voters for turnout-buying. Where money fuels campaigns but elections center around candidates, not parties, how do candidates pitch electoral handouts? We analyze candidates’ distribution of cash during an Indonesian election. Drawing upon varied data, including surveys of voters and brokers, candidates’ cash-distribution lists, and focus-group discussions, we find heavy spending, but little evidence of vote-buying or turnout-buying. Instead, candidates buy brokers more than voters: with little loyalty or party brand to draw on, candidates seek to establish credibility with well-networked brokers, who then protect their turf with token payments for their own presumed bloc of voters. Consistent with our argument that these are non-contingent payments, we find little evidence of monitoring of either voter or broker behavior.有关选举庇护主义（electoral clientelism）——即以选举支持为对价的物质利益交换——的研究，通常会预设强势政党的存在。政党能够为买票（vote-buying）行为提供监督与执行保障，并帮助选举掮客（brokers）识别核心选民以开展参选率收买（turnout-buying）。倘若竞选活动依赖资金投入，但选举竞争的核心是候选人而非政党，那么候选人该如何推介其选举赠礼？ 我们针对印尼某次选举期间候选人的现金分发行为展开实证分析。本次研究综合多类数据资料，涵盖选民与选举掮客问卷、候选人现金分发清单以及焦点小组访谈（focus-group discussions）记录，结果显示候选人投入了巨额资金，但几乎未发现直接买票或参选率收买的相关证据。与之相反，候选人的收买对象更多为选举掮客而非选民：由于缺乏可依托的选民忠诚度或政党品牌，候选人试图与人脉深厚的选举掮客建立信任关系，选举掮客随后会通过向其认定的选民团体发放象征性报酬（token payments）来守护自身势力范围。与我们提出的“此类支付属于无条件给付”的论点一致，我们几乎未发现对选民或选举掮客行为进行监督的相关证据。