Social control of public expenditures in a multilevel principal-agent approach

ABSTRACTThis study enhances the principal-agent model by incorporating a multilevel perspective and differences among agency situations. A theoretical discussion is developed using a proposed intersection of methodological focuses and a descriptive-exemplificative hypothetical analysis. The analysis is applied to public expenditure social control in representative democracies, and as a result, a principal-agent model unfolds that incorporates a decision-making perspective and focuses on formulation, negotiation, articulation, and implementation competencies. Thus, it is possible to incorporate elements into the principal-agent model to make it more permeable to individual, group, and societal idiosyncrasies with respect to public expenditure social control.摘要 本研究通过纳入多层级视角与代理情境差异，对委托-代理模型（principal-agent model）进行拓展。研究依托所提出的方法论聚焦交叉维度，结合描述性例证式假设分析展开理论探讨。将该分析应用于代议制民主国家的公共支出社会管控场景后，最终构建出融入决策视角、聚焦制定、协商、阐释与执行能力的委托-代理模型。据此，可向该模型中纳入相关要素，使其能够更好地适配公共支出社会管控场景下个体、群体与社会层面的异质性特质。