Data for: "Political Competition Over Life and Death - Social Provision and Infant Mortality in India"

This package includes data and codes to replicate all results in "Political Competition Over Life and Death - Social Provision and Infant Mortality in India", by Anders Kjelsrud, Kalle Moene and Lore Vandewalle.

Paper Abstract:
We argue that economic inequality harms social provision to the poor, but higher political competition can mitigate this effect. We test this hypothesis using a large redistricting of electoral boundaries in India. Higher economic inequality leads to more post-neonatal infant deaths, but only when political competition is weak. We assert that the effect on mortality operates via changes in social provision at the local level and confirm this for two different programs: Inequality leads to worse performance of public healthcare and weaker provision of the workfare program MGNREGA, but only in situations with little political competition.