Domestic Authority and Foreign Economic Policies in Chinese History

*NOTE:* The included files cover the data and replication code for each of the three working papers that comprise this dissertation. By the time these files are available, it is likely that the author will have updated versions of each of these files. If you are interested in using these data, please contact the author directly or visit his website for the most updated versions. Concerns about domestic authority shape how governments conduct their foreign policies. However, this influence is often difficult to observe in highly opaque, non-democratic political systems. In the first part of the dissertation, I investigate the link between domestic authority and foreign policy in the context of diplomacy and trade in late imperial China, a period that spans the Ming (1368-1644) and Qing (1644-1911) dynasties. I argue that international diplomacy can serve leaders’ domestic political needs when it is highly visible to relevant audiences; conducted with counterparts held in relatively high esteem domestically; when certain diplomatic practices are historically associated with regime authority; or when diplomacy is wielded by leaders with relatively low levels of legitimacy. Using an original dataset of over 5,000 Ming and Qing tribute exchanges, I demonstrate that Chinese emperors newly in power conducted a disproportionately high volume of diplomatic activity. I find weaker evidence that this effect was more salient among low-legitimacy emperors. An accompanying case study illustrates how the Yongle Emperor deployed tribute diplomacy as a tool for domestic authority consolidation. Turning to the trade policies of the same period, I argue that beyond leaders, other autocratic elites who participate in foreign policy making are motivated by similar authority concerns. Extant research on non-democratic trade policy has largely neglected this group of actors. I develop a theory that predicts variation in elite policy preferences based on top-down and bottom-up authority relations with the leader and local trading communities, respectively. To assess these claims, I introduce a dataset on the maritime trade preferences of several hundred individual elite officials in late imperial China created through 10 months of archival work in Beijing and Taipei. The data suggest that coastal provincial officials became key pro-trade advocates during the Qing dynasty. The findings offer an example of how trade preferences can vary within a non-democratic regime, and how historical cases can be especially useful for empirically studying these preferences. In the third paper, the dissertation then flips the focus from the domestic politics of Chinese foreign policy to how other states’ internal politics shape their engagement with contemporary China. I argue that leaders of small developing countries can seek greater domestic authority by acquiring “prestige projects,” defined as highly visible, nationally salient international development projects. After identifying a set of Chinese government-financed prestige projects using a new dataset on Chinese development finance, I show that these projects are overwhelmingly concentrated in the world’s poorest and smallest countries, and that their implementation may be associated with higher public support for recipient governments. I also find that China’s government supplies more prestige projects to states that increase their support for Chinese diplomatic objectives.*注*：本数据集收录了构成本学位论文的三篇工作论文的全部数据与复现代码。截至本数据集发布之际，作者大概率已更新过各文件的版本。若您计划使用本数据集，请直接联系作者或访问其个人主页获取最新版本。 内政权威的考量会左右各国政府的外交政策制定，但这类影响在高度不透明的非民主政治体系中往往难以直接观测。 本论文第一部分以跨越明（1368年—1644年）、清（1644年—1911年）两代的中国帝制晚期时期的外交与贸易为研究场景，探讨内政权威与外交政策之间的关联。本文提出，当外交活动对相关受众具有高度可见性、交往对象在国内享有较高威望、特定外交惯例与政权权威存在历史关联，或是由合法性水平相对较低的领导人开展时，国际外交可成为领导人满足国内政治需求的工具。本文依托一套涵盖5000余条明清朝贡往来 (tribute exchanges) 的原创数据集，验证了新登基的中国皇帝会开展远超常规规模的外交活动；同时仅获得较弱的实证支持，即该效应在合法性较低的皇帝群体中更为显著。配套的案例研究展示了永乐皇帝如何将朝贡外交作为巩固内政权威的工具。 转向同期的贸易政策研究，本文提出，除国家领导人外，参与外交决策的其他专制精英同样会出于类似的内政权威考量采取行动。现有关于非民主政体贸易政策的研究大多忽视了这一行动群体。本文构建了一套理论框架，基于精英与领导人之间的自上而下权威关系、以及精英与本地贸易社群之间的自下而上关系，预测不同精英群体的政策偏好差异。为验证上述理论主张，本文通过在北京与台北开展的10个月档案调研，构建了一份涉及晚清帝国数百名精英官员海上贸易偏好的原创数据集。数据分析结果显示，清代沿海省份官员成为了支持贸易的核心力量。本研究结果为非民主政权内部贸易偏好的异质性提供了实证案例，也凸显了历史案例在实证研究这类偏好时的独特价值。 在第三篇工作论文中，本学位论文将研究视角从中国外交的国内政治逻辑，转向其他国家的内部政治如何影响其与当代中国的交往。本文提出，小型发展中国家的领导人可通过获取“威望项目 (prestige projects)”——即具有高度可见性、全国关注度的国际发展项目——来强化自身国内权威。本文通过一套全新的中国发展融资数据集识别出一批中国政府资助的威望项目后，研究发现这类项目绝大多数集中于全球最贫困、规模最小的国家，且项目实施可能与受援国民众对本国政府的支持率提升存在关联。本文还发现，中国政府会向那些提升对中国外交目标支持度的国家提供更多威望项目。