Replication Data for: Historical Exposure to Statehood, Ethnic Exclusion, and Compliance With the State

Many states in the developing world cannot consistently deliver public goods or credibly threaten coercion in order to generate widespread citizen compliance. Why do some citizens still comply? We argue that legacies of early statehood interact with post-colonial ethnic politics to produce conditional quasi-voluntary compliance. Historical exposure to centralized political authority increases citizen compliance with the state due to persistent state-centric norms, but this relationship is conditional on contemporary access to state power. We combine a novel indicator of historical state exposure in Africa with a large sample of geo-located survey respondents to test the argument. Our results indicate that proximity to historical capital cities is associated with greater compliance for respondents whose ethnic groups currently hold executive-level state power. A case study of compliance with vaccination mandates in the precolonial kingdom of Buganda provides additional evidence in support of our argument.发展中世界的诸多国家难以持续供给公共物品，亦无法可信地以强制手段相威慑，以实现公民的普遍服从。为何仍有部分公民选择服从国家治理？本研究提出，早期国家建构的历史遗产与后殖民族群政治相互作用，催生了具备条件性的准自愿服从行为。由于以国家为中心的社会规范持续存续，历史上曾接触中央政治权威的群体，其公民服从国家的意愿会更强；但这一关联受到当代获取国家权力渠道的条件限制。本研究结合非洲地区历史国家接触度的全新衡量指标，与带有地理位置信息的大规模受访样本数据，对上述理论观点进行检验。研究结果显示，对于当前其族群掌握行政级国家权力的受访者而言，居住地距离历史都城越近，其公民服从度越高。针对前殖民时期布干达王国境内民众服从疫苗接种强制令的案例研究，为本研究的观点提供了补充佐证。