Replication data for: Inside Autocracy: Political Survival and the Modern Prince

Virtually all African autocrats now govern with parliaments and organize regular, multiparty elections. They have little choice. Since the end of the Cold War, Western governments have required nominally democratic institutions in exchange for aid, investment, and debt relief. With violent repression impossible to conceal from the international community, life as an autocrat has grown more difficult. Since 1989, autocrats forced to govern with nominally democratic institutions have been 80% more likely to lose power than their counterparts. Between 1986 and 2000, the number of autocracies in Africa fell from 45 to 30. The rate of democratization has slowed, for Africa's autocrats learned to survive democratic institutions. To understand how, this dissertation focuses on the Republic of Congo, ruled by Denis Sassou Nguesso for all but five years since 1979. Using original data on the Congolese elite, their political parties, elections, and the security apparatus, this dissertation finds that Africa's autocrats confront challenges old and new with different constraints. Accordingly, they find different solutions. Autocrats once relied on single parties to prevent elite coups. They now secure compliance with social tools. By redefining the pool of candidates for the regime's critical positions, Africa's autocrats employ a \"politics of hope,\" which induces loyalty when elites are excluded from the regime. To monitor appointees, Africa's contemporary autocrats create social institutions, in which new recruits interact with trusted aides. Autocrats supplement these with parallel governments, which force elites separated by cleavages to compete against each other. When Africa's autocrats deploy these monitoring devices effectively, they forgo arbitrary purges in favor of tenure policies that reward competence. The international community's insistence on elections creates \"focal moments,\" when citizens sense their shared discontent. Since the y believe international attention will shield them from repression, opposition leaders mobilize unrest. This institutional landscape compels autocrats to fashion electoral alliances with opposition leaders. By joining the regime they once impugned, opposition leaders sacrifice public credibility for ministerial perquisites. Popular goodwill constitutes an insurance policy, and so Africa's autocrats commission surrogates to generate it. With repression less credible, autocrats construct their security apparatuses to threaten violence without provoking it.如今，几乎所有非洲威权统治者（autocrats）都借助议会开展统治，并定期组织多党选举。他们此举实属别无选择。自冷战结束以来，西方各国政府要求受援国建立名义上的民主制度，以此作为提供援助、投资及债务减免的交换条件。由于暴力镇压已无法对国际社会隐瞒，威权统治者的统治处境愈发艰难。1989年以来，被迫借助名义民主制度开展统治的威权统治者，其权力旁落的概率比同类统治者高出80%。1986年至2000年间，非洲的威权政权数量从45个降至30个。民主化进程有所放缓，原因在于非洲威权统治者已摸索出在民主制度框架下存续的方法。为探明其中缘由，本论文以刚果共和国（Republic of Congo）为研究对象——自1979年以来，除5年之外，该国始终由德尼·萨苏-恩格索（Denis Sassou Nguesso）执政。本论文借助关于刚果精英群体、其所属政党、选举活动及安全机构的一手数据，研究发现：非洲威权统治者面临着新旧交织的挑战，且受限于不同的约束条件。因此，他们也提出了差异化的应对方案。过往威权统治者曾依靠单一政党防范精英政变，如今他们则借助社会手段维系统治合规性。通过重新界定政权核心岗位的候选人范围，非洲威权统治者采用了一种"希望政治"（politics of hope）：当精英群体被排除出政权体系时，该策略可有效激发其忠诚度。为监控任命官员，当代非洲威权统治者创设了社会制度，令新入职人员与可信助手开展互动。威权统治者还辅以平行政府（parallel governments）机制，迫使因派系分歧而对立的精英群体相互竞争。当非洲威权统治者有效运用这些监控手段时，他们会放弃任意清洗政策，转而采用以能力为导向的任期制度。国际社会对选举的坚持创造出"关键节点"（focal moments）：此时民众会察觉到彼此共通的不满情绪。由于反对派领袖认为国际关注会使其免受镇压，他们便会动员民众发起抗议活动。这种制度环境迫使威权统治者与反对派领袖组建选举联盟。反对派领袖加入其此前曾抨击的政权，以牺牲公众公信力为代价换取部长级特权（ministerial perquisites）。民众的好感度相当于一份保险，因此非洲威权统治者会委托代理人来打造这种好感。由于镇压手段的可信度下降，威权统治者会构建安全机构，以在不引发对抗的前提下实施暴力威慑。