WHICH CHARACTERISTICS OF PRICE-FIXING AGREEMENTS ARE RELATED TO A GREATER DAMAGE TO CONSUMERS?

ABSTRACT Despite the deterrence effect generated by antitrust laws, the fact is that many collusive agreements end up forming in the economy. An essential task is to understand how distinct market characteristics affect cartel profits and damages. This paper develops a theoretical model to assess which characteristics of price-fixing agreements are related to greater damage to consumers. Results indicate the following characteristics as responsible for greater damage: higher product similarity (substitutability); lower elasticity of demand (in absolute values); greater number of members; higher demand potential; and a higher velocity of transactions. Price-fixing agreements that have these characteristics more intensely, in comparison to others, tend to be more harmful to consumers, and, therefore, should be prioritized by antitrust authorities regarding detection, prosecution, and punishment.摘要 尽管反垄断法能够产生威慑效应，但现实中仍有大量合谋协议在经济活动中形成。明确不同市场特征如何影响卡特尔利润与消费者损害，是一项核心研究任务。本文构建理论模型，以评估哪些固定价格协议特征会对消费者造成更严重的损害。研究结果显示，以下特征会加剧损害程度：更高的产品相似度（可替代性）、更低的需求弹性（取绝对值）、更多的成员数量、更高的需求潜力，以及更快的交易速度。相较于其他固定价格协议，具备上述特征的协议对消费者的损害往往更为严重，因此反垄断执法机构应将其列为检测、起诉与处罚的优先对象。