genderbribery

Stata File on Experimental Data on the Paper “Men are the Better Corrupt Friends – The Role of Gender Differences and Social Ties in Bribery”

Abstract: “This paper investigates the interplay of gender, social ties, and negative externalities in bribery using a laboratory experiment. In a modified dictator game with third-party interventions, men more often engage in bribery than women, particularly when they have social ties with the briber. Conversely, women more often accept bribes but not reciprocate in cases with high externalities. In cases of low negative externalities, no gender differences in bribery exist. The findings suggest that women prioritize fairness considerations, while men place greater emphasis on reciprocity toward the briber when they have social ties.”

The experimental procedure involves two stages. Firstly, subjects are randomly assigned to two respective groups following the procedure by Chen and Li, 2009. Secondly, participants play a modified dictator game with a third-party player. Subjects are either assigned to the role of the dictator (or the victim) or the third party and are equally endowed with 6€. The experimental design includes two treatments in a between-subjects design, which varies the relative closeness between the third party and the dictator/victim. In "TP-dictator" the third party and the dictator belong to the same group, while the victim belongs to the outgroup. In "TP-victim" the third party and the victim belong to the same group, while the dictator belongs to the outgroup. The players make the following decisions.
The dictator makes three decisions:
(1) whether to take money (zero, 2€ or 4€) from an outgroup player, i.e., the “victim”;
(2) whether to bribe an ingroup third party (with an amount between zero and 6€, in 50 Cents increments);
(3) whether to bribe an outgroup third party (with an amount between zero and 6€, in 50 Cents increments).
Decisions (2) and (3) are implemented conditional on the group identity of the third party to elicit strategic considerations in bribery by the dictator. That is, the dictator is asked how much to offer in the case of being matched with an ingroup and in the case being matched with an outgroup third party.
On the contrary, the third-party player is informed about the group memberships of the respective players, i.e., the dictator and the victim. The third party makes three decisions:
(1) whether to accept or reject the bribe;
(2) whether to report the dictator in the case of taking 2€;
(3) whether to report the dictator in the case of taking 4€.
Decisions (2) and (3) are elicited by means of the strategy method and are independently of decision (1). If the dictator has taken 2€ or 4€ and the third party has decided to report the respective decision, the amount taken by the dictator is returned to the victim. If the third party has decided to accept the bribe, the dictator keeps the bribe, even if they has decided to report the briber.

《男性为更佳的行贿伙伴——性别差异与社会关系在贿赂中的作用》实验数据 Stata 文件摘要：本研究通过实验室实验，探讨性别、社会关系与负外部性在贿赂中的相互作用。在引入第三方干预的改良独裁者游戏中，男性相较于女性更频繁地参与贿赂行为，尤其是在与行贿者存在社会关系的情况下。相反，女性更频繁地接受贿赂，但在外部性较高的案例中，她们不会进行回报。在外部性较低的案例中，不存在性别差异。研究结果表明，女性更重视公平性考量，而男性在有社会关系的情况下，更注重对行贿者的回报。实验程序分为两个阶段。首先，根据陈和李（2009年）的程序，随机将受试者分配到两个不同的组别。其次，参与者参与一个改良的独裁者游戏，其中包含第三方玩家。受试者被分配到独裁者（或受害者）或第三方的角色，并均获得6欧元。实验设计包括两种处理方法，在受试者间设计中，改变了第三方与独裁者/受害者之间的相对亲近程度。在“TP-独裁者”中，第三方与独裁者属于同一组，而受害者属于外组。在“TP-受害者”中，第三方与受害者属于同一组，而独裁者属于外组。玩家需做出以下决策。独裁者需做出三个决策：（1）是否从外组玩家（即“受害者”）那里拿取金钱（0欧元、2欧元或4欧元）；（2）是否贿赂内组的第三方（金额介于0至6欧元之间，以50分位递增）；（3）是否贿赂外组的第三方（金额介于0至6欧元之间，以50分位递增）。决策（2）和（3）基于第三方玩家的组别身份，以激发独裁者在贿赂中的策略考量。即独裁者被询问在匹配到内组第三方和匹配到外组第三方的情况下，应提供多少金额。相反，第三方玩家了解各自玩家的组别身份，即独裁者和受害者。第三方玩家需做出三个决策：（1）是否接受或拒绝贿赂；（2）在独裁者拿取2欧元的情况下，是否报告独裁者；（3）在独裁者拿取4欧元的情况下，是否报告独裁者。决策（2）和（3）通过策略方法激发，与决策（1）独立。如果独裁者拿取了2欧元或4欧元，且第三方决定报告相应决策，则独裁者拿取的金额将退还给受害者。如果第三方决定接受贿赂，即使他们决定报告行贿者，独裁者也能保留贿赂金额。