A POLICY MIX TO PREVENT A NON-COMMONS TRAGEDY FOR COLLECTIVE FOREST RESERVES IN AGRARIAN SETTLEMENTS IN NORTHWEST MATO GROSSO

ABSTRACT Agrarian reform settlements have recently been identified as a major contributor to ongoing deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon. Collective forest reserves were established in some settlements to thwart forest loss, but settlers usually do not recognize forest commons, opting instead for continued private accumulation through forest clearing, or a "non-commons" tragedy. Pathways toward ensuring the viability of common-pool management in settlements remain unclear. Our case study focused on two similarly sized settlements in neighboring municipalities in Northwest Mato Grosso, Brazil, each with formally designated collective forest areas. In one, deforestation shifted into the collective reserve and intensified; in the other, deforestation stabilized and the collective reserve was protected. In the latter, settlers understood their collective forest reserve as a commonly held asset, with two commercially viable settlement cooperatives involved in Brazil nut (Bertholletia excelsa) extractivism and added value processing. We analyze differences between the two settlements using Elinor Ostrom's framework for analysis of socio-ecological systems, and identify the locally applied policy mix ensuring the viability of a forest commons. The study concludes that "top-down" efforts to institutionalize collective governance over remaining forests will likely fail in most settlements, without a focus on alternative livelihood opportunities synergetic with forest tenure.