Data and Code for: Health Insurance Design Meets Saving Incentives: Consumer Responses to Complex Contracts
收藏ICPSR2022-01-01 更新2026-04-16 收录
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资源简介：
To lower health care costs, Health Savings Accounts (HSAs) offer tax incentives encouraging people to trade off current consumption against future consumption. This paper tests whether consumers use HSAs as self-insurance over their life-cycle. Using administrative data from a large employer and a regression discontinuity design, I estimate the marginal propensity to consume from HSA assets is 0.85 and reject the neoclassical benchmark of zero. Comparisons with 401(k) saving show most employees do not treat HSA money as fungible with retirement savings. In this setting, HSAs did not reduce health spending and instead increased the share that was financed tax-free.
提供机构：
University of Virginia
创建时间：
2022-01-01
