Shaming into Compliance? Country Reporting of Convention Adherence to the International Labour Organization

When does social pressure in the form of “naming and shaming” induce states to concede their prerogatives by providing potentially compromising information to international organizations (IOs)? We provide answers to that question in what we believe is the first systematic study of the impact of social pressure on state reporting practices, as an act of member procedural compliance. We develop related hypotheses by drawing on realist theory and theories of social pressure and test them, in the 1992-2011 period, by analyzing government reporting on multiple conventions to the International Labour Organization (ILO). We find that governments tend to respond negatively to ILO “naming” (as we define it) for some, but not all, ILO conventions. More specifically, we conclude that governments tend to resist reporting on domestic social conditions—here, related to inequality, discrimination, and exploitation—but more readily report on issues (conventions) that are tied directly to the ILO’s core mission, where government culpability is also clearer. We also conclude that shaming—by “shortlisting” governments and holding them to account in public sessions—boosts compliance across a wider range of issues.