Data and software for "The effects of reputation on inequality in network cooperation games"

Processed experimental data, NetLogo script for agent-based model, and Python scripts for model and data analyses for the paper "The effects of reputation on inequality in network cooperation games" in <i>Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B.</i> The experimental data comes from the following studies:K. Kamei, L. Putterman, Play it again: Partner choice, reputation building and learning from finitely repeated dilemma games. <i>Econ. J.</i> 127, 1069–1095 (2017).G. E. Bolton, E. Katok, A. Ockenfels, How effective are electronic reputation mechanisms? An experimental investigation. <i>Manag. Sci.</i> 50, 1587–1602 (2004).G. E. Bolton, E. Katok, A. Ockenfels, Cooperation among strangers with limited information about reputation. <i>J. Public Econ.</i> 89, 1457–1468 (2005).I. Seinen, A. Schram, Social status and group norms: Indirect reciprocity in a repeated helping experiment. <i>Eur. Econ. Rev.</i> 50, 581–602 (2006).J. A. Cuesta, C. Gracia-Lázaro, A. Ferrer, Y. Moreno, A. Sánchez, Reputation drives cooperative behaviour and network formation in human groups. <i>Sci. Rep.</i> 5, 7843 (2015).D. Melamed, A. Harrell, B. Simpson, Cooperation, clustering, and assortative mixing in dynamic networks. <i>Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.</i>, 201715357 (2018).D. O. Stahl, An experimental test of the efficacy of a simple reputation mechanism to solve social dilemmas. <i>J. Econ. Behav. Organ.</i> 94, 116–124 (2013).R.C. Bayer, Cooperation in partnerships: The role of breakups and reputation. <i>J. Institutional Theor. Econ. JITE</i> 172, 615–638 (2016).A. Harrell, D. Melamed, B. Simpson, The strength of dynamic ties: The ability to alter some ties promotes cooperation in those that cannot be altered. <i>Sci. Adv.</i> 4, eaau9109 (2018).