Replication Data for: Reforming Global Governance: Power, Alliance, and Institutional Performance

A large literature analyzes the determinants of change in international institutions, focusing on the role of systemic political and economic shocks. However, we consider this question also in more "business-as-usual" periods, asking when institutions of global governance reform and which states benefit from these changes. We argue that allies of IOs' leading stakeholders benefit more than non-aligned countries; however, we also document that reforms sometimes contain concessions to non-allied members. We theorize that while IO officials reward major stakeholders' allies in normal times, they provide concessions to non-allies during periods of poor IO performance to prevent these states from disengaging. Pairing statistical analysis using an original dataset of reforms at the World Bank between 1944-2018 with qualitative evidence, we find significant support for our hypotheses. Our findings help make sense of otherwise puzzling instances of power shifts within IOs.