Replication Data for: Revisiting the Relationship Between Legislative Power-Sharing and Autocratic Survival

Conventional wisdom holds that legislatures stabilize autocratic rule by helping leaders credibly commit to sharing power with regime insiders, but empirical support for this claim remains limited. Data limitations make it impossible to directly measure the extent of legislative power-sharing across time and space, leading scholars to use the presence or absence of a legislature as a proxy. I conceptualize legislative power-sharing as a continuous trait and estimate it using a dynamic Bayesian latent variable model for all autocracies from 1946 to 2023. After validating the measure, I use it to replicate previous studies of the relationship between legislative power-sharing and autocratic survival. I find that their results do not hold. If anything, legislative power-sharing appears to be associated with greater, not less, vulnerability to being removed from office by coups and revolts. I suggest that scholars should devote more attention to the threat-enhancing effects of authoritarian institutions.