Table_1_Does cooperative intervention affect pricing decisions in the agricultural supply chain?.docx

In global agricultural markets, farmers often face profit squeezes due to low bargaining power, which affects the sustainability of agriculture and the livelihoods of farmers. Cooperative intervention is seen as a key solution to improve bargaining power and optimize profit distribution in the agricultural supply chain. In this study, a two-stage dynamic game model is adopted to focus on bargaining power and compare the effects of linear pricing versus a double charging system under cooperative intervention. It is found that the cooperative is better when it has full bargaining power or when it faces downstream sellers with comparable bargaining power, and the dual-charging system is more favorable. When cooperatives bargain with sellers, the degree of differentiation of agricultural products affects the cooperatives’ profitability and cooperatives tend to maintain the two-part tariff when the bargaining power is less than a threshold condition containing the degree of differentiation of agricultural products; when discounts exceed the threshold, cooperatives shift to linear pricing to safeguard their profitability. Numerical analysis validates the theory and reveals the changing pattern of cooperative profits under market forces. This study not only provides theoretical support for the study of supply chain pricing strategies under the condition of considering the bargaining power of producers (farmers) but also provides management insights for the stability and sustainable development of agricultural supply chains. Its novel dynamic game framework is cross-culturally applicable to help farmers’ cooperatives cope with the challenge of profit distribution in a global context and emphasizes the importance of differentiation strategies to enhance bargaining power and promote fairness and efficiency in global agricultural supply chains.

在全球农业市场中，农民往往由于议价能力不足而面临利润压缩，这影响了农业的可持续性以及农民生计的稳定性。合作干预被视为提高议价能力和优化农业供应链中利润分配的关键解决方案。在本研究中，采用两阶段动态博弈模型，聚焦于议价能力，并比较了在合作干预下线性定价与双重收费系统的影响。研究发现，当合作组织拥有充分的议价能力或面对具有相当议价能力的下游销售商时，合作组织更为有利，而双重收费系统更为可取。当合作组织与销售商进行议价时，农产品的差异化程度影响了合作组织的盈利能力；当议价能力低于包含农产品差异化程度的阈值条件时，合作组织倾向于维持两部制关税；当折扣超过阈值时，合作组织转向线性定价以保障其盈利能力。数值分析验证了理论，并揭示了在市场力量下合作组织利润的变化模式。本研究不仅为在考虑生产者（农民）议价能力条件下的供应链定价策略研究提供了理论支持，而且为农业供应链的稳定和可持续发展提供了管理洞见。其新颖的动态博弈框架具有跨文化适用性，有助于农民合作组织应对全球环境中利润分配的挑战，并强调了差异化战略在增强议价能力、促进全球农业供应链公平与效率方面的重要性。