Replication Data for: \"Unpaved Road Ahead: The Consequences of Election Cycles for Capital Expenditures\"

Canonical political budget cycle theories predict an increase in visible government expenditures in election years due to signaling by incumbents. We identify the presence of an alternative election-related distortion of government budgets---a drop in capital expenditures---that applies in low capacity and weak governance settings. In election years, the increase in scrutiny and distraction of politicians and bureaucrats decreases the ability of governments to facilitate complicated capital investments. We test this argument by exploiting the exogenous phasing-in and timing of local direct elections in Indonesian districts and detailed data on local budget compositions to document the existence of meaningful reductions in capital expenditures in election years. This effect is mediated by the status of incumbents. While safe incumbents who are running for re-election can avoid this particular type of distortion, elections with embattled incumbents or without incumbents running for re-election exhibit much stronger effects.