Data and Code for: "Dynamic Oligopoly Pricing with Asymmetric Information: Implications for Horizontal Mergers"

We model repeated pricing by differentiated product firms when each firm has private information about its serially-correlated marginal cost. In a fully separating equilibrium of the dynamic game, signaling incentives can lead equilibrium prices to be significantly above those in a static, complete information game, even when the possible variation in the privately-observed state variables is very limited. We calibrate our model using data from the beer industry, and show that, without any change in conduct, our model can explain increases in price levels and changes in price dynamics and cost pass-through after the 2008 MillerCoors joint venture.<br><br>This archive contains MATLAB code to replicate the computational examples in the paper (i.e., the results outside of Section 3 and online Appendix C). Fake data moments are provided that will produce calibration and counterfactual results similar, but not quite identical to, the baseline specification calibration and counterfactual results in the paper. If proprietary IRI Academic Data Set is available (see citations in the README) STATA and MATLAB code is provided to generate the Section 3 and Appendix C tables and figures.