Replication Data for: \"The Curious Case of the Migrating Seat: Understanding the Role of Senate Norms in Confirming Judges on the U.S. Courts of Appeals\" (Political Research Quarterly)

R code and data to replicate analyses in \"The Curious Case of the Migrating Seat: Understanding the Role of Senate Norms in Confirming Judges on the U.S. Courts of Appeals\" The confirmation of lower federal court judges heavily depends on senatorial courtesy and the blue slip. Prior work largely ignores state representation---a norm whereby each judgeship on the U.S. Courts of Appeals is assigned to a particular state in the Circuit. Given this norm, senators expect that the president will nominate someone from the same state as the departing circuit judge. However, presidents fail to follow this norm nearly a quarter of the time. This research analyzes how ignoring state representation increases the level of conflict over a nominee. Our results reveal that (a) the probability of a nominee's Senate confirmation and (b) the efficiency with which the Senate takes final action both decrease as the ideological distance between the previous home state senators and the president grows. Additionally, if the new home state senators reveal public opposition to a nomination, the likelihood of rejection and time to final action increase. (forthcoming in Political Research Quarterly).