Replication Data for: Policies Make Politicians: Intermediaries, State Benefits, and Political Entrepreneurship in Brazil

If “policies make politics,” can they also make politicians? We argue that being a bureaucrat with discretion over policy benefits can catalyze political ambitions and boost electoral success. As agents of the state rather than parties or interest groups, such bureaucrats wield a broadly accepted political currency. We examine the political careers of Brazilian bureaucrats who issue DAPs, a document granting benefits to small farmers. Leveraging a panel analysis from 2004–2020, we show that as bureaucrats issue more DAPs, they are more likely to become candidates, gain votes, and win election. DAP issuers run for office at higher rates than other public-facing bureaucrats with less control over policy benefits, suggesting that discretion is the key political currency, not social status or public contact. Our analysis underscores how the adoption of means-tested social policies can create new sources of political capital and brokerage in areas long dominated by traditional elites.