THE DIALECTIC OF DIPLOMACY AND CONFRONTATION IN US-IRAN RELATIONS: DOMESTIC POLITICS, INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN, AND THE LIMITS OF LIBERAL INSTITUTIONALISM (1979-2026)

Since the 1979 revolution in Iran, relations with the United States have seesawed between periods of talk and periods of military tension. This paper tries to understand why diplomatic efforts between these two countries have so often ended without lasting results. The study draws on 20 academic articles, official documents, and policy institute reports. It applies Robert Putnam's "two-level game" theory as its main framework. The central finding is that diplomatic failures in US-Iran relations come less from material interests or ideological clashes than from the way domestic politics consistently overrides international negotiations. The paper looks at five distinct phases: the immediate post-revolutionary period (1979–1988), a phase of cautious engagement (1989–2001), the securitization that followed 9/11 (2001–2009), the JCPOA breakthrough (2009–2017), and the years of maximum pressure and military confrontation (2017–2026). The JCPOA, though carefully built, still fell apart-not because it was badly designed, but because political opposition inside both the United States and Iran proved too strong. The military escalation of 2025–2026 fits the same recurring pattern: coercion and secret diplomacy exist side by side in an uneasy balance. The paper ends by arguing that real stability will require agreements that can survive changes in government and withstand domestic political pressures.