Online Resource Data for the book NATO's Lessons in Crisis: Institutional Memory in International Organizations

​Strategic errors cost lives. Some international organizations (IOs) learn from such failures whereas others tend to repeat them. Given that IOs experience high rates of turnover, how is it possible that any IO retains knowledge about the past? This book introduces an argument for how and why IOs develop institutional memory of strategic errors in international crisis management. The design of learning infrastructure - from lessons learned offices to lesson databases - can inadvertently disincentivize IO elites (i.e. high-level officials) from using it. Given the risks, elites instead largely rely on transnational interpersonal networks, as well as private documentation and conversations. Memory survives but remains highly dependent on a few individuals. The book draws on the author's interviews and a survey experiment with 120 NATO elites. Cases from Afghanistan, Libya and Ukraine further illustrate the argument. Findings challenge existing organizational learning scholarship - suggesting that formal learning processes alone are insufficient for learning; design matters. The book concludes with policy recommendations for strengthening IOs' capacity for knowledge retention.