The effect of rights-based fisheries management on risk taking and fishing safety Proceedings of the National Academy of Science of the United States

Commercial fishing is a dangerous occupation despite decades of regulatory initiatives aimed at making it safer. We posit that the individual allocation of fishing quota can improve safety by solving many of the problems associated with the competitive race to fish, which manifest themselves in risky behavior such as fishing in poor weather. We present a previously unidentified approach to evaluation: estimating the change in the propensity to start a fishing trip in poor weather conditions as a result of the management change. We chronicle a revolution in risk-taking behavior by fishermen (a 79% decrease in the annual average rate of fishing on high wind days) that is due to the change in economic incentives provided by rights-based management. 2016 PMC4791003 NMFS (National Marine Fisheries Service) NWFSC (Northwest Fisheries Science Center) PMC https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1509456113 Other 1952