Replication Data for: Outsourcing Bureaucracy

The solution to weak bureaucratic capacity in developing countries is often presumed to be more accountability. By contrast, I show how accountability initiatives can work at cross purposes with efforts to build capacity by imposing heavy compliance costs on civil servants. I show, further, that when compliance becomes too costly, public-spirited agency directors sometimes use nonstate organizations as political tools to escape the accountability rules that limit creativity and effectiveness. This practice of outsourcing bureaucracy to avoid accountability rules may help to explain new ‘pockets of effectiveness’ among government service programs in developing countries. Drawing on a combination of in-depth interviews and descriptive statistics, I show how outsourcing was a key factor in producing higher levels of effectiveness in two of Brazil’s most vaunted social-sector programs. However, I also suggest that outsourcing bureaucracy may ultimately limit state capacity, even if it helps to build capable programs in the short run.