Model and Data: To signal or not to signal? A non-cooperative game-theoretic approach to discretionary communication between road users

This dataset contains the results and the Python files which constitute the simulation package used in the paper. Reciprocal communication between road users is a vital element of road user interaction. Previous work has shown that non-cooperative game theory can effectively model and characterise communicative behaviour between road users and produce emergent benefits for both the issuer and recipient of communicative signals. We build on these findings by introducing discretionary communication to gain an advantage over the other road user by masking one’s intent if beneficial to do so. We conduct a series of experiments with simulated interactions and compare interaction outcomes where communication is mandatory against those where communication is discretionary. Our findings further support the conclusion that non-cooperative game theory is an effective paradigm for modelling and producing emergent behaviours which benefit the network. Moreover, we see that including a layer of discretionary communication reaps benefits in interaction outcome to the communicator. It also provides benefits in safety to all parties involved above and beyond the benefits seen from mandatory communication.