Replication Data for: Teaching Cooperation: The effect of shared neoliberalism on sanctioning behavior

In the literature, sanctioning behavior has been linked to a number of aggregate domestic factors, most notably shared democracy in sender/target dyads. One missing factor, I argue, is the economic orientation of leaders and governments when making sanctioning decisions. Economic orientation is important because it dictates how states interact with other states. In addressing this, I argue that orientation towards neoliberalism is important, as the global economy has become increasingly neoliberal over time. I hypothesize that when two states or leaders share a neoliberal orientation, it has an effect similar to that of the democratic peace, with sender states being less likely to threaten sanctions but more likely to impose sanctions. Using data drawn from the Threat and Imposition of Sanctions (TIES) dyadic dataset, I test these assertions using a series of two-stage Heckman models and individual logistic regression models. Results indicate that neoliberalism has a constraining effect on threats. However, contrary to expectations, neoliberalism does not have a consistently significant effect on sanctions imposition.