Replication Data for: Strategic Allocation of Irrevocable and Durable Benefits

The logic behind redistribution theories is that incumbents target benefits to build and sustain linkages with voters. However, a recent literature shows that some benefits can have a countervailing effect in environments plagued by clientelism: by permanently boosting voters’ incomes, irrevocable and durable benefits might reduce the voters’ dependence on incumbents. This article explains how parties strategically allocate these benefits when trading off the income effect relative to the standard electoral rewards of redistribution. The theory highlights a previously unstudied rationale to target opposition areas: to weaken voters’ dependence on machines. The framework is tested with administrative data on the allocation of cisterns by state governments across Brazilian semi-arid municipalities, where clientelism is rampant. States favor areas governed by copartisans, but only where local clientelistic mobilization is weak. Where it is strong, states favor municipalities led by the opposition, while avoiding their own local strongholds.