ECIN Replication Package for "Tacit Collusion by Pricing Algorithms"

<div>This repository contains replication package for Economics Inquiry article "Tacit Collusion by Pricing Algorithms". </div><div>This article contributes to the debate about the potential of pricing algorithms to collude</div>and earn supra-competitive profits without explicit communication. By simulating<br>competition among seven algorithms, we demonstrate that: (1) algorithms can reach<br>supra-competitive prices in a reasonably short time, taking less than 1/1,000th the time<br>taken by algorithms in recent studies; and (2) tacit collusion among the algorithms is<br>robust to the choice of different algorithms by competing firms. These results address<br>the main criticisms concerning the practical relevance of recent studies that demonstrate<br>algorithmic collusion. We find that the top-performing algorithms are nice, forgiving,<br>provocable, and flexible.<br>