Hypotheses with corresponding test variables.

We study costly communication in a common-pool resource (CPR) experiment as a proxy for two different forms of participatory processes: as a public good and as a club good. A public communication meeting, representing centralized participatory processes, occurs when all group members’ monetary contributions reach a specified threshold. Club communication meetings, representing networked participatory processes, follow only among those members of the group who pay a communication fee. We test whether the way costly communication is provided affects the willingness of participants to contribute to communication, as well as the dynamics of such payments, and the content of communication. This is done by analyzing contributions to communication and communication content of 100 real-life resource users participating in a lab-in-field experiment. We find that contributions towards communication are higher when communication is public, and that club communication features more frequent but less inclusive communication meetings. Also, communication content is more oriented towards addressing the collective action problem associated with the management of the resource when communication groups are attended by all participants. The identified differences between the two ways to provide for communication can inform policies and the design of participatory processes in natural resource governance.