Peacekeepers Abroad: Analyzing the Subsequent Conflict Prospects for Troops Deploying Nations

Does contributing troops to UN peacekeeping operations reduce a state’s propensity for interstate conflict? While existing research examines peacekeeping’s effects on host countries, troop-contributing countries’ (TCCs) own conflict behavior remains understudied. I theorize two mechanisms: costly signaling that credibly communicates peaceful intent, and socialization through UN doctrine and multinational networks that institutionalizes restraint. Analyzing 1990-2014 country-year data with multiple participation measures, I find that greater peacekeeping engagement is associated with lower conflict hostility, reduced initiation probability, and fewer disputes overall. Using ordered logit, logit, and zero-inflated negative binomial models with extensive robustness checks, matching, selection correction, fixed effects, and dynamic specifications; results demonstrate consistent negative associations. These findings expand conventional wisdom by identifying peacekeeping as both a global public good and a domestic risk-reduction strategy, redirecting institutional theory from hosts to senders and specifying how international engagement reshapes state behavior.