Replication Data for: American Diasporas, Homeland Human Rights Conduct, and the Onset of Human Rights-Based Economic Sanctions

Why does the U.S. government choose to initiate human rights-based economic sanc- tions against some highly repressive target countries, but not others? And, under what conditions does it do so? In this paper, I posit an interactive theory wherein I argue that diaspora size moderates the relationship between target human rights con- duct and the onset of human rights-based economic sanctions. I contend that as the size of a diaspora increases, its capacity to influence the onset of human rights-based economic sanctions strengthens, as it can more effectively 1) lobby decisionmakers in Congress and the White House directly as well as 2) indirectly via using contentious action to mobilize public opinion, which intensifies the pressure on Congresspersons and the President to act. To test my contention, I combine U.S. sanctions data with data on American diasporas and homeland human rights conduct and find that while diaspora size strongly and consistently moderates the relationship between homeland human rights conduct and the onset of Congressional sanctions, its moderating impact on Presidential sanctions is inconsistent and, moreover, negligible when addressing en- dogeneity and other concerns.