Template Attack against First-Order and Second-Order Masked Dilithium Implementation

This dataset is used to perform the first template attack (TA) targeting the NTT-domain polynomial matrix-vector multiplication $\mathbf{\hat{W}}_i=\mathbf{\hat{A}}\mathbf{\hat{y}}_i$, a previously unexplored leakage source in masked Dilithium, to recover the private key $\mathbf{s}_1$ of first-order and second-order masked Dilithium implementations.Please note that the entire power traces dataset for first-order and second-order masked Dilithium implementations is of significant size, around 600G. Therefore, we have only documented the points of interest (POI) extraction process for the first NTT-domain coefficient in folder 0. PPC.Within folders 1. First Order and 2. Second Order, the power traces are organized as POI, and the Mahalanobis distance based Template attack (MD-based TA) against the first/second masked implementations is employed to recover the private key.In the near future, we aim to optimize the data collection methodology and make the entire dataset publicly accessible.