Replication Data for The Assault on Civil Society: Explaining State Repression of NGOs

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are central to contemporary global governance and their numbers and influence have grown dramatically over the twentieth century. However, more than 130 states have repressed these groups within the last three decades, suggesting that a broad range of states perceive them as costly. When they choose to repress NGOs, under what conditions do states use violent strategies versus using administrative means? The choice of crackdown strategy (violent crackdown or administrative crackdown via legal restrictions) against NGOs is dependent on two main factors: (1) the nature of threat posed by these groups and (2) the consequences of cracking down on them. Violent crackdown is useful in the face of immediate domestic threats, such as protests. However, violence may increase the state's criminal liability, reduce its legitimacy, violate human rights treaties, and further intensify mobilization against the regime. Therefore, states are more likely to use administrative crackdown, especially in dealing with long-term threats, such as when NGOs influence electoral politics. I test this theory using an original dataset of administrative crackdown against NGOs, as well as violent crackdown on NGO activists across all countries from 1990-2013. To shed light on the strategic decision between using violent or administrative crackdown, and how states may perceive threats from domestic and international NGOs differently, I use a case illustration of India. I conclude by discussing the implications of this crackdown on the use of civil society actors by the international community, as well as donors and citizens in the Global South.