Creditor Protection and the Application of the Solvency and Balance Sheet Tests under the Company Laws of Finland and New Zealand

Creditor protection in the recently adopted Finnish Limited Liability Companies Act (FLLCA)1 has gone through structural changes compared to the preceding Finnish Limited Liability Companies Act of 19782. Novelties in the creditor protection of the FLLCA is that asset distribution is tied to maintaining the solvency of the company and contrary to the 1978 Act, creditor protection now covers also the company’s distributable reserves of unrestricted equity. Consequently, assets may be distributed only if the company has adopted a financial statement,3 which indicates the amount of the company’s reserves of unrestricted equity that may be distributed,4 unless otherwise ensues from a solvency test. The solvency requirement is set forth in Chapter 13, section 2 of the FLLCA: “Assets shall not be distributed, if it is known or should be known at the time of the distribution decision that the company is insolvent or that the distribution will cause the insolvency of the company.” It is important to notice that the solvency test applies not only to the distribution of reserves of unrestricted equity, but also to restricted equity even when the creditors have consented to its distribution in accordance with the creditor protection procedure laid down in chapter 14 of the FLLCA. The aim of this paper is to discuss the solvency test and the balance sheet test5 in chapter 13, section 5 of the FLLCA respectively, and assess how they should be carried out as well as what should be taken into account when doing so. Moreover, as an example I will compare the tests to creditor protection in the New Zealand Companies Act (NZ CA)6, with a special focus on whether the solvency test therein could help in the application or practical development of the solvency and balance sheet tests in Finland. The extreme distance of New Zealand to Finland and the fact that the common law system differs in both history and content from the Finnish legal system, were not the only reasons for selecting this creditor protection system as the point of comparison. It was chosen as an example of how two legal systems with different historical backgrounds and in two countries far apart can end up with rather similar mechanisms for solving conflicts of interest between creditors and shareholders, with the aim to prevent the opportunism of insiders, i.e. management and controlling shareholders. The comparison also serves as a tool for examining the control mechanisms of basically dispositive company legislation ex ante. The 1993 NZ CA reform is a valid reference point also in other respects, because its ideas and goals for modernisation were similar to those prevailing in the reform process of the FLLCA. Accordingly the NZ CA aims: “To encourage efficient and responsible management of companies by allowing directors a wide discretion in matters of business judgment while at the same time providing protection for shareholders and creditors against the abuse of management power.”7 In their extensive commentary of the NZ CA reform, Ross Grantham and Charles Rickett maintain that the act should 1) be understood as a model agreement between different interest groups in a company, 2) prevent any opportunistic behaviour of management and controlling shareholders, 3) in its extent and nature correspond to the risk of abuse of controlling positions and not prevent financial activities, and 4) be sufficiently simple and not too detailed.8 Thus it is no surprise that both the FLLCA and the NZ CA include provisions on creditor protection based on the maintenance of company solvency in addition to the traditional balance sheet test now used for determining the amount of net assets. The adoption of the solvency test also required reform of the regulation of modern limited liability companies and their activity. The traditional balance sheet and share capital-oriented creditor protection cannot be considered a sufficient means of meeting the requirements of good and efficient company legislation that protects all interest groups. The purpose of the solvency test is very simple. It aims to ensure the allocation of creditors in terms of assets and liabilities, by preventing such distribution of assets that would endanger the timely payment of receivables to creditors in the proper amount. Under NZ CA the solvency test is applied not only to the protection of creditors, but to fixed preferential returns on shares ranking ahead of those in respect of which a distribution is made.9 Technically, this entails that in the application of the solvency test under NZ CA the above-mentioned shares are considered debt according to their financial character.

新近颁行的《芬兰有限责任公司法》（Finnish Limited Liability Companies Act, FLLCA）¹中有关债权人保护的条款，相较于1978年版旧法²，已发生结构性变革。该法在债权人保护领域的创新之处在于：资产分配与公司偿债能力维持直接挂钩；且与1978年版法案不同，新版债权人保护规则的适用范围现已涵盖公司的无限制权益可分配储备。据此，除非经偿债能力测试另有规定，公司仅可在编制财务报表³并明确标注可分配无限制权益储备金额的前提下，开展资产分配。《芬兰有限责任公司法》第13章第2条明确规定了偿债能力要求："若在作出资产分配决策时已知悉或应当知悉公司已处于破产状态，或该资产分配将导致公司破产，则不得进行资产分配。"需特别注意的是，偿债能力测试（solvency test）的适用范围不仅包括无限制权益储备的分配，亦覆盖受限权益——即便债权人已依据《芬兰有限责任公司法》第14章规定的债权人保护程序同意分配该类受限权益。本文旨在分别探讨《芬兰有限责任公司法》第13章第5条规定的偿债能力测试与资产负债表测试（balance sheet test）⁵，并评估二者的实操路径及实施时需考量的核心要素。此外，本文将以《新西兰公司法》（New Zealand Companies Act, NZ CA）⁶中的债权人保护规则为参照样本，重点探讨其中的偿债能力测试能否为芬兰偿债能力测试与资产负债表测试的适用及实务完善提供借鉴。新西兰与芬兰地理相距甚远，且两国的普通法系与芬兰法系在历史沿革与制度内容上均存在显著差异，但这并非选取该债权人保护体系作为比较样本的唯一动因。选取新西兰法系作为参照，核心原因在于其展现了两种历史背景迥异、地理位置相隔甚远的法律体系，最终可形成高度相似的机制以解决债权人与股东间的利益冲突，防范内部人——即管理层与控股股东——的机会主义行为。该比较分析同时可作为考察任意性公司立法事前管控机制的工具。1993年新西兰公司法改革在其他领域亦具备参考价值，因其现代化的理念与目标，与芬兰有限责任公司法改革进程中秉持的核心思路高度契合。据此，新西兰公司法的立法目标为："通过赋予董事在商业判断事项上广泛的自由裁量权，鼓励公司开展高效且负责任的经营管理，同时为股东与债权人提供保护，防范管理层权力的滥用"⁷。罗斯·格兰瑟姆（Ross Grantham）与查尔斯·里基特（Charles Rickett）在其针对新西兰公司法改革的详尽评述中指出，该法案应达成四项核心目标：1）被理解为公司内部不同利益群体间的示范协议；2）防范管理层与控股股东的任何机会主义行为；3）在范围与性质上与控股股东控制权滥用的风险相匹配，且不阻碍正常金融活动开展；4）足够简洁且避免过度细化⁸。由此不难理解，无论是芬兰有限责任公司法还是新西兰公司法，除保留现行用于确定净资产额的传统资产负债表测试外，均纳入了基于维持公司偿债能力的债权人保护条款。偿债能力测试的引入，亦推动了现代有限责任公司监管规则及其经营活动的改革。传统的资产负债表与以股本为导向的债权人保护机制，已无法满足保障良好且高效的公司立法、保护所有利益群体的现实需求。偿债能力测试的目标极为简明：通过禁止可能危及债权人按时足额收取应收款项的资产分配行为，确保债权人在资产与负债层面获得公平清偿。根据新西兰公司法，偿债能力测试不仅适用于债权人保护，亦适用于享有固定优先分红的股份——此类股份的受偿顺位优先于拟分配资产所对应的股份⁹。从技术层面而言，这意味着在适用新西兰公司法下的偿债能力测试时，前述股份将依据其财务性质被视为债务。

搜集汇总

背景与挑战

背景概述

该数据集聚焦于芬兰和新西兰公司法中的债权人保护机制，重点分析了芬兰《有限责任公司法》中偿付能力测试和资产负债表测试的结构变化及其应用，并与新西兰《公司法》进行对比，探讨两者如何通过相似机制解决债权人与股东间的利益冲突，以防止管理者和控股股东的机会主义行为。