Replication Data for: Parochial Altruism in Civil Society Leaders: Legacies of Contested Governance

What explains variation in civil society organization (CSO) leadership quality in post-conflict settings? International donors perceive CSO leaders as chief purveyors of democracy in local communities after war due to their control of substantial resources and relationships with political actors. I theorize that wartime uncertainty generated by contested governance motivates parochial altruism among CSO leaders by conditioning them to retain resources. Discrimination emerges because rebel takeover exacerbates existing cleavages, inducing CSO leaders to discriminate against outgroups. To test this theory, I leverage geographic variation in rebel control in Côte d'Ivoire through lab-in-the-field games. I find that CSO leaders who lived under contested governance are less altruistic and more discriminatory than their counterparts under continuous government control. I provide suggestive evidence of the mechanism drawn from interviews and survey data. These findings complicate our expectations of post-conflict democratization by providing greater understanding of the impact of relying on war-traumatized CSO leaders.