Replication Data for: Leader Hawkishness, Political Survival, and Interstate Crises

I argue leader hawkishness influences the reciprocal relationship between political survival and interstate conflict. Whether leaders will initiate a crisis when they are politically secure should be conditional on their willingness to use force and whether domestic audiences prefer hawks over doves should depend on the security environment. I find support for my argument between 1919 and 2001 using a recently developed measure of leader hawkishness. Hawks are consistently more likely to initiate crises than doves, but differences are largest when leaders are politically secure. Hawks and doves face similar risks of removal when crisis initiation is unlikely, but comparatively hawkish leaders are less likely to lose office and more likely to come to power when structural conditions make initiation likely. My findings demonstrate analyzing how leaders' desire to remain in power, their personal attributes, and domestic audiences' preferences interact can yield new insights about international relations.