Replication Data for: Peaceful Neighborhoods and Democratic Differences

Democracies are thought to behave differently than other states, particularly when cooperating in international institutions, such as alliances. We contend, however, that these democratic differences largely depend upon geopolitical environments that make cooperation possible. Though studies have demonstrated endogeneity between democracy and peace, few analyze the effects of this joint relationship on democratic differences in cooperative foreign policy behavior. We explore this argument using the alliance literature. We argue that the empirical finding that democracies are more reliable alliance partners is driven by the tendency of democracies to cluster in peaceful environments. Alliances are more likely to be “scraps of paper” when found in more dangerous environments. By jointly modeling regime type and political environment using data on alliance termination from 1920–2001, we show that alliance reliability is a function of the latter rather than the former. Our argument has important ramifications for a host of literatures focused on regime type, as well as current debates over the effectiveness of democratic deterrence.