Replication Data for: The Host Country’s Regime Type and Investor State Dispute Settlement Provisions

Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) is a safety net for investors to protect property. Since host countries have to surrender control over dispute outcomes, they may be hesitant to involve external ISDS entities. Regarding ISDS provisions in BITs, some suggest that democratic host countries with existing institutions may find it easier to offer third-party venues. Conversely, others argue that nondemocratic host countries that lack existing institutions will delegate the ISDS authority more readily to convince investors. This article builds on both strands of the literature and formally explores which types of host countries agree to ISDS provisions in BITs. The equilibrium results show that, while democratic host states are more likely to offer ISDS channels, if nondemocratic host states offer one, they tend to provide stronger mechanisms than democratic counterparts. Using a dataset of 1,592 BITs from 1970 to 2018, I empirically test the model’s results.