Replication Data for: The Cart and the Horse Redux: The Timing of Border Settlement and Joint Democracy

Do democratic dyads handle their disputes more peacefully than non-democratic dyads, or have they cleared the most contentious issues (i.e., unsettled borders) off their foreign policy agenda before becoming democratic? In this study, we compare the conflicting answers of the democratic peace and the territorial peace and examine the empirical record to see which is more accurate. We find that almost all contiguous dyads settle their borders before they become joint democracies. Furthermore, the majority of non-contiguous dyad members also settle their borders with all neighboring states before their non-contiguous dyad becomes jointly democratic. Such findings are consistent with the theoretical expectations of the territorial peace, rather than the democratic peace. They also weaken a core argument of the democratic peace, for our analysis finds that one reason democratic dyads may handle their disputes more peacefully than non-democratic dyads is not because of their institutions or norms, but rather because they have dispensed with the disputes most likely to involve the use of military force prior to becoming democratic.