Evolution of conditional cooperation in collective-risk social dilemma with repeated group interactions

The question of how cooperation evolves and is sustained over time has been a long-standing and unresolved issue in the fields of evolutionary biology and social sciences. Previous theoretical and experimental research based on the collective-risk social dilemma game has revealed the risk that the failure of collective goals will affect the evolution of cooperation. Considering that in the real world individuals usually adjust their decisions based on environmental factors such as risk intensity and cooperation level, it is still not well understood how such conditional behaviors affect the evolution of cooperation in repeated group interactions scenario from a theoretical perspective. Here, we construct an evolutionary game model with repeated interactions, in which defectors decide whether to cooperate in subsequent rounds of the game based on whether the risk exceeds their tolerance threshold and whether the number of cooperators exceeds the collective goal in the early rounds of the..., We use MATLAB to numerically compute the evolutionary dynamics of the system., , # Evolution of conditional cooperation in collective-risk social dilemma with repeated group interactions

[https://doi.org/10.5061/dryad.80gb5mkw0](https://doi.org/10.5061/dryad.80gb5mkw0)

The dataset contains data on the computation of selection gradients in infinite populations. The dataset presents the data in Figure 1a of the related research paper.

## Description of the data and file structure

These data can be obtained through the provided Matlab code.

## Code/Software

All the figures in the paper were implemented using Matlab.