Models in science: traces of historical-epistemological evolution

Abstract What is a model? In this article we present some historical and epistemological aspects of the notion of model from its insertion in science to its more contemporary conception. The scenario is limited to formal and factual sciences. Analyzing some discussions between philosophers of science and scientists, regarding the different notions of model, we start from the end of the 19th century when mechanical models and analogies in physics appear (1860), we go through the models in mathematical logic (1920), then by mathematical models, object-models and their theoretical models (1950) and we arrive at the end half of the 20th century when the computational models appear (1980). It is then realized that the answer to the question "what is a model?" cannot be given universally. A drawing, a diagram, a sketch, an illustration, a concrete object (mockup), a mathematical structure (symbolic model), a computer software, a copy of something (iconic model), all this can be considered a model of something. Taken in the epistemological sense, all can be considered as concrete or abstract structures that aim in some way to represent different aspects of a certain reality, thing, fact or phenomenon.