Data and code for: "Does entry remedy collusion? Evidence from the generic prescription drug cartel"

This workspace contains data and code for the article "Does entry remedy collusion? Evidence from the generic prescription drug cartel." The article is summarized as follows. <br>Entry represents a fundamental threat to cartels. We study the extent and effect of this behavior in the largest price-fixing case in US history, which involves generic drug manufacturing. We link information on the cartel’s internal operations to regulatory filings and market data. There is a substantial increase in entry after cartel formation but regulatory approvals delay most entrants by 2-4 years. We then estimate a structural model to simulate counterfactual equilibria. Absent entry, cartel profits would be dramatically higher. Correspondingly, reducing regulatory delays by just 1-2 years equates to consumer compensating variation of $559 million-$1.3 billion.